

Charisma and contradiction: the legacy of Pierre Elliott Trudeau

[Clarkson, Stephen](#) . [Queen's Quarterly 107.4](#) (Winter 2000): 590-607.

Pierre Elliott Trudeau's legacy is a subject so distorted by paeans of praise from his acolytes and admirers, so scorched with vituperation by his political and intellectual enemies, so awash in controversy (which he continually provoked by contradicting his critics as well as himself) that making a balanced assessment - even when his agile body and his indomitable spirit have finally been stilled - becomes an extremely delicate task, one made no easier because it can have several meanings. To make sense of him, we have to make sense of ourselves and the twentieth-century Canada we shared with him.

SHOULD our scope be so narrow that we rate him only on those issues in which he was himself personally engaged, such as Quebec nationalism and constitutional reform or, later on, energy and native rights? Or should our net be cast much more widely? Since his name has become affixed to the whole era from 1968 to 1981, should he not be assessed on everything that happened during those dynamic and troubled sixteen years, on the grounds that he was in charge - and so personally responsible for it all?

There is also the tricky question of what has occurred since his retirement. Many blame him for the dramatic adoption of a neo-liberal agenda in the Mulroney-Chretien period, arguing that there would have been no need for the drastic attack on social programs if the Trudeauites had not set in train a series of budgetary deficits whose cumulated weight had to be tackled by his successors.

Our understanding of what happened in history often changes, not because it has changed but because we, the observers, have shifted our positions. The historian Jack Granatstein originally condemned Trudeau's tough action during the October crisis of 1970, but now he applauds it. Right wingers, who could never bring themselves to vote for such a "socialist" as Trudeau, flocked to support his attack on a distinct society status for Quebec. Those on the left, who excoriated what they saw as his niggardliness towards social policies when he was governing, now wax nostalgic for the golden age of the generous welfare state.

We have to be aware of the extent to which this question of Trudeau's legacy is as much about us as it is about him. In our mourning, are we sloughing off onto him our collective responsibility for what has happened? In our grieving, are we projecting onto him our anger about the lost opportunity to build that independent Canada which no leader could have created under the inexorable pressures of American domination?

The Trudeau Record

THIS is not the time to do a study of Trudeauology and rank his rankers' assessments of his Work, weighing the superlatives of his idolizers and assessing the condemnations of his demonizers. Suffice it to look at Trudeau's record in the light of his own positions, however inconsistent.

Let us start with his first political promise, that of participatory democracy. It was a powerful slogan and, as he once acknowledged to me, sprang from both a lack of knowledge of the Liberal Party to whose leadership he aspired and his need to induce its activists to support his candidacy. He buttressed the slogan he had pinched from the American Students for a Democratic Society in the 1960s with the thoughts of Jean- Jacques Rousseau in the 1760s whom he paraphrased by telling the public in general,

but his Liberal Party militants in particular, that they could and should play a direct role in decision making in Ottawa. In this way they could produce the laws by which they would then consent to be governed. Once elected to office he did not weasel out of this promise but continued for a while to hold out the lure to his partisans that they could animate what he suggested would become a mass party and share in deciding policy directions for his government.

Did he fail to make good on this promise? Yes. Was he apologetic? No. Did he explain? Of course. Because he found another rationalization, this time not taken from the populist stream of Western political thought, but from its opposing elitist current. Borrowing from John Locke and Edmund Burke and lifting the ideas of his Harvard University economics history professor, Joseph Schumpeter, he spat back at his astonished supporters that they had no business claiming the right to interfere with the workings of government. Policy was not to be made in the streets by mobs or even students. If they were unhappy with what he was doing, they should shut up and wait for the next election when, if they still had a complaint to make, they could throw him out.

And what about the just Society? This was the great end for which participatory democracy constituted the means, but which Trudeau defined in two different ways. Some of his texts and speeches referred to justice in terms of the liberal notion of equality of opportunity. But he also, and just as clearly, endorsed the thoughts and writings of his covertly Marxist friend at the University of Toronto, Hugh Macpherson, to the effect that justice was impossible without social equality - a much higher bar over which to jump.

Depending on which definition of "just" one takes, Trudeau was either a success or a failure. He did improve equality of opportunity by implementing universal medicare and by defending it. He took pride in the steps taken to promote interprovincial equality through regional development programs. But in terms of narrowing the gap between rich and poor, a gap he had brilliantly denounced as part of his 1950s critique of Canadian capitalism, his government achieved very little. Indeed some of the progress made in deepening the welfare state that he had inherited from the much more activist Pearson period, he and his colleagues proceeded to undo by cutting back unemployment benefits and by restraining wages more than prices in both 1975-76 and 1982-83. Social spending actually stayed fairly constant during his period in office. And if our notion of a just society is one where government support systems provide a classless approach to social infrastructure, then the last years of the Trudeau era can be seen to have initiated the move away from universalism to the selected, income-tested targeting of the poorest and neediest that characterizes his successors' neo-liberal system. At best, the Trudeau era didn't let material inequality increase.

Trudeau's writings of the 1950s and 1960s were quite clear in their identification of the unregulated free market as a source of social inequality. Ironically, what created the mounting deficits and the exponentially rising national debt they produced was not uncontrolled spending on social programs but excessive catering to the business community's agenda.

By appointing John Turner as minister of finance and Simon Reisman as his deputy minister in the early 1970s, Trudeau in effect mandated the most powerful agency of his government to cut back taxes on business and on the upper income strata. Prefiguring Mike Harris and Ernie Eves by a quarter of a century, Turner and Reisman deliberately made the federal government incapable of financing the more generous, guaranteed annual income approach to social welfare whose achievement Trudeau entrusted to his strongest ally, Marc Lalonde, the minister of national health and welfare, assisted by the capable Al Johnson as his deputy. Was this oversight? Was it an accident? It seems more like a perverse application of his much touted theory of counterweights - blocking the left-leaning thrust of one part of his government with countervailing action by an opposing, right-leaning thrust.

We encounter a similar conundrum when we consider Trudeau's much mythologized proclivity for strong central government. "Who will speak for Canada?" was certainly a legitimate question for the leader of such a decentralized federal system to pose when confronting the baying pack of provincial premiers. Many Canadians supported the view that Canada did indeed need a strong federal government that could provide the universal standards and services they expected a modern state to offer.

By now readers will not be surprised if I point out that, here again, Trudeau's clarity was lavished on both sides of this issue. He had cut his teeth as an intellectual in the 1950s denouncing Liberal Ottawa's centralizing proclivities, when the St Laurent government pushed grants to universities down the throats of the provinces in defiance of education falling within their constitutional jurisdiction. In office, one of the Trudeau government's most effective - if least understood - actions was to dismantle the fiscal base for federal dominance by abandoning the policy instruments that had made Ottawa's primacy possible in the first place. The Established Program Funding of 1977 washed Ottawa's hands of the conditional grants it had previously made to the provinces in support of specific social programs. In the name of decentralization and provincial autonomy, this new unconditional bloc funding allowed the provinces to do what they wished with the federal tax revenues that were placed in their hands. It pre-figured Paul Martin's Canada Health and Social Transfer by almost two decades.

When we turn to the neighbouring issue of national unity, we come to that policy on which Trudeau first lavished his government's energy. Official bilingualism may have been set in train by Lester Pearson and his bilingualism and biculturalism commissioners, but language rights for francophone minorities outside Quebec and inside the federal government were marketed by Trudeau as the panacea that would mollify the grievances of French-speaking Canadians and, even in Quebec, make the separatists finally feel at home from coast-to-coast-to-coast. By the time the Parti Quebecois first won power in 1976, Trudeau himself admitted failure.

But he did not admit error. He could never see that his one-dimensional solution to Quebec's alienation was irrelevant. Insisting it was enough to correct the federal government's past linguistic mistakes, he denied to Quebec nationalists the progressive, interventionist, muscular state that their vibrant democracy was demanding and that he himself advocated for the federal government. In the end lie became an incarnation of that intolerant, overbearing English-Canadian nationalism which he had once decried as the first cause of Quebecers' defensive nationalism. In this intolerance he reinforced the very separatism that he had entered politics to defeat.

Even his beloved Charter of Rights and Freedoms - the product of so much of his political tenacity and the fruit of his Harvard training in individualistic liberal constitutionalism - is lodged in self-contradiction. Trudeau was a child of the modernist generation that came of age during World War II and, armed with Lord Keynes' formulae, committed itself to building a powerful state that could banish unemployment and, harnessing the private sector to public ends, create a social-democratic order for an industrialized society. He preached the virtue of government when run by men of integrity (such as himself) as a necessity for reforming the reactionary society into which he had been born. And he supported the trade union movement to defend the weak against the strong.

But in the Charter he created an instrument that weakened parliamentary government. Besides empowering minorities, it gave corporations a greater capacity to defend themselves, by exploiting the new guarantees of individual rights against a state whose mission, in Trudeau's own view, was to defend the interests of the whole. For all its progressive use on behalf of women's rights and those of other beleaguered groups such as gays, lesbians, and handicapped people, the Charter's double-edged blades are sharp enough to enable the forces of the irresponsible free market, which Trudeau understood at one point so clearly, to liberate themselves even further from the balancing effect that democratically elected

legislatures might want to impose. For instance, the Charter was used to eviscerate the very election expense legislation to increase electoral fairness and contain the corrupting power of corporate cash in politics that the Trudeau government successfully enacted in 1974.

If we turn to Trudeau's foreign policy, especially his handling of Canada's relations with the all-important United States, the same analysis can be replicated. There were glaring contradictions between clear views taken on high moral grounds and clear explanations of low pragmatic performance. Both were equally well justified by his rhetoric, their inconsistency unresolved. Trudeau fought a long, bitter battle to achieve constitutional sovereignty vis-a-vis Great Britain, but it was only late - too late - in his political career that he turned his attention to repatriating some of the country's economic sovereignty from the USA. The same government that stood up to the bullying tactics of Ronald Reagan's administration left Canada vulnerable to an astonishingly disempowering trade agreement with the same president. The inspiring words on developing nations' poverty that Prime Minister Trudeau expressed elegantly and empathetically in a famous speech at London's Mansion House in 1975 made bitter reading for any Third World country expecting them to produce more generous Canadian support for the plight of the clearly oppressed or for those resisting apartheid in South Africa.

Assessed on the basis of the power and contradictions of Trudeau's own printed and spoken words, the prime minister's fifteen years in government raise quite a different question. How can we explain - if reason were our only guide (passion having been banished, as he so famously admonished us) - our interest in this man and his government which was in so many ways a failure?

Most explanations seem circular. Because we are interested in Trudeau, therefore he is interesting. Because he fascinates us, therefore we find him fascinating. A more sophisticated explanation might suggest that Trudeau has remained a charismatic. But that answer begs a further set of questions. Did the charisma lie in his person? In the Canadian public? Or in their interaction?

The Continuing Charisma

IF it takes two to tango, it takes a whole society plus one to charisma. Because charisma is a function of the interplay between the leader and the led, we need to understand the psychology of the connection between the subject (him) and the objects (us). We know that the first burst of Trudeaumania 32 years ago did exhibit the qualities that Max Weber first articulated. A mysterious, somewhat intriguing, powerfully attractive figure and a public with certain psychic and social needs did indeed create the conditions for a charismatic connection. Canadians in 1968 were both full of hope and riven by angst. Pierre Trudeau was perceived as a messiah who could lead them to the greatness that the centennial celebrations of 1967 had made them believe was theirs for the grasping and who could also deal with that threat to this destiny that Quebecois separatism presented.

But we also know that, for Weber, charisma cannot last. Once successfully installed in office, the charismatic leader necessarily becomes "routinized" through being drawn into the operations of bureaucratic government. Trudeau governed for a very long period, during which time he alienated almost every group in the public worthy of insult Unlike the charismatic US President John Kennedy or civil rights leader Martin Luther King, he was not martyred before being discredited. But the charismatic effect continued nonetheless.

Canadians supported his vision in large enough numbers to re-elect him prime minister three more times after 1968. They responded personally to his promise of nirvana-by-Charter in individual testimonies before the joint committee of parliament that turned a somewhat timid draft into the more comprehensive document by which so many Canadians swear today. When questioned by opinion pollsters, it turned out

that millions felt that the Charter had indeed created new rights for them, whether as new Canadians or as ethnic minorities or simply as individuals.

Had this assessment been written on the weekend after his retirement from politics, we probably would have agreed that it was an unusual feat for Trudeau to have retained his charismatic relationship with the Canadian public despite having been routinized with a vengeance in the federal bureaucracy and despite not having been martyred by assassins. Sixteen years later, when Trudeau had been out of office as long as he had been in power, public fascination with him was still such that it could be characterized as charismatic.

Until his terminal illness became public knowledge, focus groups kept reporting that Trudeau was the Canadian most people would prefer to have dinner with - along with Wayne Gretzky. CTV acclaimed him in the final days of 1999 as the most exciting Canadian of the twentieth century.

In a recasting of the gilded legacy, Trudeau is even given credit for the brilliant innovation of the notwithstanding clause which is correctly lauded for balancing the Charter with a legislative counterweight - although he himself had vehemently opposed the device at the time the Charter was being negotiated with the premiers. For these enthusiasts, Trudeau's appeal shines on untarnished by time's ravages.

There are, of course, critics like Guy Laforest of Laval University, who see Trudeau as responsible for the "end of the Canadian dream." Because of the prime minister's stubborn insistence on individual rights and bilingualism and thanks to his unrelenting attacks on Quebec nationalists, a core of responsible academic analysts, notably York University's Ken McRoberts, believe he did more than anyone to create Canada's continuing crisis, which could leave the country broken following one more referendum.

In Trudeau's own province there are demonizers in abundance who find his very name a source of apoplexy, who demonstrated outside his house protesting the twentieth anniversary of the War Measures Act, and who made his appearance at the last rally of the 1995 referendum campaign a liability for the No side. There is still a feeling of betrayal, a sense that, if he had only been on the other side of the great debate, Quebecers would by now be independent. The resentment still burns at his stinging rebukes over the bad French they spoke, over their narrowness, their chauvinism.

All these emotions that well up in the Quebec nationalist breast attest to Trudeau's negative power in the Quebec imagination. This demonization does not negate his charismatic appeal; it confirms it: for, if this man is such a source of anger, it is because his magic was feared.

The idolaters I have cited witnessed Trudeau enter the political theatre in the late 1960s. But there is another generation, those who only came to political consciousness in the years when Trudeau was prime minister. These are analysts like Robert Mason Lee who writes that, if Trudeau could enrage his father the Mountie, he was good enough for the son. Trudeumania meant love and "Trudeau made me," he wrote. Philosopher Mark Kingwell came to political awareness when Trudeau was already a media icon, a star, a mythical personality whose every move fascinated, whether the "fuddle duddle" in the august parliamentary chamber or the errant wife boogying with the Rolling Stones.

These are Trudeau's children, for whom Canada was great because their prime minister had something special about him. He wasn't just sexy because he was dating Barbra Streisand or Margot Kidder or Liona Boyd; he was completely different from other politicians. His vision shaped much of the Canada in which they were raised. They were sent to be "immersed" in bilingual schools, bearing his example with them in their minds, travelling to the other culture in large numbers, striking up acquaintanceships, making

friends and love, all on the altar of the bilingual hope for their collective future. And, like the Quebec separatists, many eager bilingualism recruits came to feel betrayed - because all their linguistic efforts did not prevent the continued national unity crises.

And there is the still younger generation, those who came to political awareness when Trudeau was already history. For them Trudeau is virtual reality, someone seen on the TV screen in news clips or documentary movies, even in textbooks. My students over the past decade, who were toddlers when he left office, have flocked to his book signings.

If you ask today's schoolchildren about Trudeau, you find they have their own ideas about what he means. One high school class in English Canada recently asserted that, for them, he represents "star quality," "being a celebrity," a "lady's man," a "media object," a "wise man"; a politician who "made Quebec angry" but was a "scholar," truly bilingual, who "likes to paddle a canoe," who "has a terrific leather jacket." Equivalent first impressions among Quebec school kids would probably be equally strong but more likely negative rather than positive.

Further up the educational food chain - in university classes where students are given Trudeau's own writings to read alongside works about him - the atmosphere is more critical. In a recent doctoral seminar, I heard the view that, yes, his constitution and Charter may have incorporated the major themes of Trudeau's liberal philosophy, the one-Canada national unity, the equality of provinces, the democratic contract, the individual rights - but they did so too rigidly, too inflexibly to accommodate the country's diversity, too inconsistently with his professed tolerance to allow Quebec to develop within the asymmetrical model it needed. Quebec does need special powers, was the class consensus, and Trudeau violated the respect that was due to provincial jurisdictions, undermining with his dogmatic individualism the communitarian basis on which the Canadian federation had originally been constructed.

In an amnesiac society whose access to its collective memory is blocked by the communications channels kept under Hollywood's control, he symbolizes for many their collective identity by proxy. Standing out in profile, the champion who could face down Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher in debate about how best to deal with the Soviet Union, the man who "branded" Canada as a bilingual and multicultural society, the leader who told us that we could create a just, participatory society through a generous and activist state: he is the idealized model of what Canadians (at least English-speaking Canadians) like to think they are. The point here is the simple affirmation of fact that we the Canadian people - those of us who loved him and those of us who hated him, those who criticized him and those who fantasized about him - responded to his aura and projected it back onto him not just then at the time, but repeatedly afterwards till death has parted him from us, whether the "us" be his fellow travellers, his political children, or his virtual offspring from neo-liberal Canada.

In Political Afterlife

The question remains, even if his legacy is remembered, why does he still fascinate us? Why, in other words, has there been political life for Pierre Trudeau after the political death that retirement from politics represents for most politicians? Consider that for several years he has been in physical decline, no longer dating the glamorous, sporting an extravagant hat or a cowboy suit. On the rare occasions when he has been photographed recently, he appeared somewhat smaller than life, frail, even reclusive.

The answer lies in something completely unique about the biography of Pierre Trudeau. We know that it was unusual for a man of ideas to go into politics in Canada and be successful. Many an idealistic intellectual has ventured onto the political field only to come to grief. But as a young man Trudeau took until his forties to work out his ideas, clarifying his analysis, writing the script for his own starring role.

Having developed that script, Trudeau entered politics and played the part, considering the camera angles, improvising on occasion, rewriting the lines when they no longer suited his purposes, but dominating the stage, making sure that the play went on and in the direction that he wanted. This was highly unusual, putting him in the ranks of statesmen like Winston Churchill and Charles de Gaulle - those who thought, wrote and were then able to act in consequence.

But what makes Trudeau unique in modern politics is his political afterlife, his capacity to withdraw from politics while remaining poised to re-enter and do battle for the ideas to which he clung, fighting not for votes but for principles, with words that still evoked powerful responses from his public. His interventions during the public debate surrounding the Meech Lake Accord turned the tide that eventually brought Mulroney's first constitutional deal to its knees in 1990. His single speech in an obscure Montreal restaurant two years later on the Charlottetown Accord immediately swayed 20 per cent of the vote outside Quebec against the deal.

In Ron Graham's selections from Trudeau's writings, published in 1998, what was interesting was less The Essential Trudeau's conscious modeling on Pascal's *Pensees* (the grandiosity was not new) than the italicized postscripts the former prime minister inserted throughout the text as addenda and errata to his earlier statements. To use a phrase popular among scholars of literature, Trudeau was practising intertextuality: he was dealing with other writings in his text - but the intertextuality was with his own earlier work. He was getting the last word once again, by selecting out the self-contradictory passages we were not meant to remember, expanding on others, and revising lines that he felt needed correcting. His definition of democracy as government by majorities of 50 per cent, for instance, got corrected in italics to make exceptions for some decisions (such as the next Quebec referendum?) which should be made by majorities greater than 50 per cent plus one vote.

Trudeau may not have been very visible in the daily headlines in the last years of his decline, but he, more than Ron Graham, or his great friend and editor, the late Gerard Pelletier, or his longtime Boswell, Tom Axworthy, was the keeper of his own intellectual heritage. In newsrooms all over the English-speaking world, the obituary writers were kept on edge by his refusal to lie down and let their last draft be the final one.

Charisma is circular. We projected onto him our longings and our hope, but he remained the keeper of his faith, the maker of his image, the guardian of his orthodoxy. For sixteen more years he remained charismatic, because he still surprised, he still insisted, he still compelled, he still wielded moral power, he was still the one who defined his Truth.

The Future of Trudeau's Past

THE last question to address is why is the present interest in Trudeau's death far more intense than that of any other prime minister? The present intense nostalgia for him may have more to do with the future than the past because of a deep transformation taking place in our political economy, one that is connected both to developments at home and changes abroad.

On the international scene we are experiencing a crisis in the world's political economy. If global financial markets are out of control and the nation state is scrambling to reassert its authority over its economic frontiers, do we not need some notion of what that state should be? If this is the case, should we not turn back to the era during which the Canadian nation-state reached its highest level of development - that is, to the era that bears Trudeau's name?

Internally, too, there is a sense of crisis in the air, but this time the crisis is in the neo-liberal paradigm. The mean state - the one that takes unemployment insurance premiums from workers and uses it to pay off the national debt, the one that cuts education budgets and then blames teachers for the crisis of the school system - is failing. Whether at the federal or provincial levels, the public can contrast neo-liberalism's rhetoric of progress and prosperity with the reality of emergency room delays and contaminated water systems. If a sullen electorate is reflecting these days with nostalgia on a nobler, more optimistic vision of society, this has something to do with the land mines that Pierre Trudeau and his colleagues had planted in Ottawa's culture and the Canadian psyche. By having defended the Canada Health Act to the end, they convinced Canadians that high quality public medical services were as central to their identity as the canoe and bilingualism.

So we look back from a post-modern, post-sovereign, post-national, post-Keynesian regime - albeit one that is led by a pre-modern prime minister - at a time when globalization has reached a watershed, when neo-liberalism has failed to deliver peace, order, and good government, let alone prevent greater disparities and deeper despairs. None of its predictions has proven out, yet the destructive capacities of the market are everywhere evident.

It may be true that Mackenzie King was the one who introduced Keynes to Canadian macro-economic policy. It may be true that John Diefenbaker was the first to champion the entrenchment of individual rights in the constitution. It may be true that Lester Pearson did more than all the others to build the welfare state in Canada. But it is Trudeau with whom we identify the state at its apogee. And it is Trudeau who articulated a conceptualization of the state's relationship to society and the individual in coherent, cutting prose which, notwithstanding all its contradictions, still sparkles with lucidity.

Nothing here is fixed. Opinions change. Former critics have become apologists. Old allies have become critics. Different generations select out different parts of his opus for praise or blame. The material is rich, provocative, arresting, and, however contradictory in its multiple versions and realities, we are able to select, turning Pierre Elliott Trudeau in his life, his work, and his writings into a giant set of Rorschach ink blots from which each of us determines the pattern we want to find.

Some maintain that today's Canada is Trudeau's Canada. They cite the familiar list - patriation, the Charter, bilingualism, French power in Ottawa, equality of the provinces, multiculturalism, Canada as exemplar to the world.

I beg to differ. Against these markers of the Trudeau era I would put a government constrained from outside by such new trade treaties as NAFTA and the WTO and constrained from inside by its own shift to neo-liberal small government. Today's Canada is decreasingly bilingual. Under the Social Union Agreement, Quebec is treated not equally with the other provinces, but distinctly. The Canadian state has been truncated by privatizing the major crown corporations, deregulating transportation, cutting back the cultural agencies, getting out of the business of managing the economy. And it faces the strong possibility of Quebec seceding from the federation.

The issue here is not whether today's Canada is Trudeau's, but whether tomorrow's Canada should be. Some might respond that surely the Trudeau paradigm is passe; it cannot be re-established by turning back the clock three decades. This objection loses its power once we remember that the paradigm on which neo-liberalism is modeled required turning back the clock a whole century.

Those who want to take the "neo-" out of Canadian neo-liberalism, now that surpluses have replaced deficits on the public agenda, need to decide which elements of Trudeau's multi-faceted and contradictory theory and practice they would resurrect. Of his liberalism, do they want his social, state-centred thrust or

his private, individual rights approach? Of his nationalism, do they feel it is his appeal to patriotic pride on the basis of a bilingual identity that needs reaffirming or is it a nationalism based on achieving some basic economic autonomy? Of his federalism, is it federal leadership or federal passivity? Of his economic management, is it his monetarism or his Keynesianism? Of his leadership model, is it his conservatism that denied that the state could play Santa Claus or his belief in a strong and active state?

The legacy is rich, but for all his attempts to watch over his orthodoxy, there is no consistency. If there are lessons to be culled from the Trudeau past for our future, it is all three generations of people who participated in his charisma who will have to do the hard work.

They will, of course, have to do this without his help. When I had an intense discussion with him not long before his death, it was clear that Pierre Trudeau's views in old age had returned to those more consistently radical positions he had adopted in his younger years. He was dismayed that global capitalism was escaping control by governments, thanks to trade liberalizing agreements like NAFTA. He deplored the social polarization resulting from deficit cutting. If his charisma persists beyond the grave in our consciousness the way he would like it to, it will be as the champion of justice and democracy, of social equality and national integrity.

BUT it is his survivors who will have to decide. This will not be an easy task. To rework the much plagiarized opening sentence of the first volume of *Trudeau and Our Times*, *The Magnificent Obsession*, let me observe by way of warning and conclusion: "He daunts us still."

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Word count: **5518**

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